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The Puzzle of Existence: Why Is There Something Rather Than Nothing?, edited
by Tyron Goldschmidt. New York: Routledge, 2013. 295 pages. $125 (hardcover), $98.77 (Kindle).
KENNETH L. PEARCE, Valparaiso University
This book contains fifteen original essays addressing issues relevant to the
question, “why is there something rather than nothing?” (henceforth, “The
Question”). As is appropriate for such a topic, the essays contain interesting and original reflections on a wide variety of subjects in metaphysics,
philosophy of religion, and philosophy of science. Most of the essays are
accessible to non-specialists, including advanced undergraduate students.
Especially to be commended in this respect is Matthew Kotzen’s essay,
“The Probabilistic Explanation of Why There is Something Rather Than
Nothing” (chapter 13), which does an excellent job of introducing some
highly technical issues in the theory of probability to a non-specialist audience. This book would be an excellent choice for graduate or advanced
undergraduate seminars covering modality, explanation, the Principle of
Sufficient Reason, and/or the cosmological argument from contingency,
if only it were not so prohibitively expensive. It is to be hoped that a less
expensive paperback will become available soon.
Rather than attempting to address every issue that appears in this book,
this review will focus primarily on those that bear on the cosmological
argument from contingency. Modern formulations of The Question have
their origin in Leibniz who argues that the Principle of Sufficient Reason
requires the existence of a being (God) who stands outside the series of
contingent things and makes that series actual. An answer to The Question along these general lines is defended by Timothy O’Connor (chapter
2). As O’Connor acknowledges at the outset (23), his project differs from
traditional natural theological projects only in its commitment to epistemic humility. One of the forms O’Connor’s intellectual humility takes is
his admission that theism is unable to provide any kind of detailed explanation of why the world is as it is. Nevertheless, O’Connor believes he can
show that theism has a significant advantage over naturalism, for, given
theism, we have at least some conception of how a full answer to The
Question would have to go: it would appeal to God’s reasons, intentions,
and so forth. On naturalism, we cannot see how The Question could possibly have an answer at all. Thus, despite the lack of a detailed explanation,
theism has a major explanatory advantage over naturalism.
In the essay which follows, Graham Oppy disputes O’Connor’s claims.
According to Oppy, theism has no explanatory advantage, for whatever
the causal structure of a theistic world, a naturalistic world with that structure can just as easily be imagined. Thus, for instance, if we can start from
pp. 341–344
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a necessary God bringing the universe into existence, we can just as easily
start from a necessary Singularity bringing the universe into existence.
Furthermore, if theism lacks an explanatory advantage, then it appears
that naturalism is to be preferred, since naturalism is superior to theism
in parsimony.
Oppy’s key point is that positing God as one more “billiard ball” in the
sequence of causes studied by science yields no explanatory advantage.
Surely he is right about this. Insofar as O’Connor is considering God as a
cause among causes, Oppy’s critique is devastating.
This difficulty was, however, already recognized by classical theistic
metaphysicians, and is precisely the point of the traditional distinction between primary and secondary causation: God is not a cause among causes,
but rather stands outside the secondary causal sequence and makes that
sequence, rather than another, actual. As has long been recognized, this
is consistent with the sequence of secondary causes being either finite or
infinite, for even if there was an infinite sequence, we could still ask, “why
that sequence and not another?” and we could still answer, “because God
so chose.” (O’Connor makes this point on p. 26.)
The key challenge for the theist at this point is to render intelligible
the notion of primary causation. If God’s creation does not involve the
sort of causal relation that obtains among (literal or metaphorical) billiard
balls, then what is it? This is not the place to explore this question, but it
is worth noting that, in recent years, analytic metaphysicians have come
to recognize that there are a variety of metaphysical relations, apart from
ordinary causation, that can figure in different sorts of explanations. These
are what Karen Bennett calls “building relations”: composition, constitution, realization, and so forth.1 Given a prior commitment to a plurality of
such relations, it is perhaps not too great a cost for the theist to introduce
one additional such relation, primary causation. The introduction of such
a relation would provide the theist with an explanation of why this contingent causal sequence obtains rather than another.
Can the naturalist do the same? Two of the essays in Puzzle do advocate naturalistic, non-causal answers to The Question. In chapter 14, Marc
Lange argues that there might be reasons within science for supposing that
the existence of something rather than nothing is naturally (i.e., physically
or nomologically) necessary, even if it is not metaphysically necessary, and
that this would explain why there is something rather than nothing. In
chapter 15, Stephen Maitzen argues that The Question can be answered by
citing any one of the myriad facts which constitute the fact that something
exists. Thus, he proposes, there is something rather than nothing because
there are penguins.
If the theist really could explain something the naturalist could not,
would theism then automatically be better than naturalism? There are at
1
Karen Bennett, “Construction Area (No Hard Hat Required),” Philosophical Studies 15
(2011), 79–104
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least two reasons one might think not. First, perhaps not all legitimate explanatory demands can be met. Second, perhaps the explanatory demand
embodied in The Question is somehow illegitimate.
The first point of view is defended by Shieva Kleinschmidt in chapter 4. Kleinschmidt criticizes recent arguments for the conclusion that the
Principle of Sufficient Reason is presupposed by our explanatory practices
and argues instead that our practices are better explained by supposing
that we take explanatory comprehensiveness to be a theoretical virtue like
simplicity. If this is so then, even if theism has an advantage in explanatory
comprehensiveness, we will have to ask whether this advantage might be
counterbalanced by defects elsewhere.
The second point of view is defended, in different ways, by Jacob Ross
(chapter 5) and Kris McDaniel (chapter 16). A presupposition of any “why”
question is that there is some fact to be explained. Where there is no such
fact, the question is ill-posed. On one interpretation of The Question Ross
considers, the explanandum at issue is the conjunction of all true contingent propositions. Ross defends an account of propositions which requires
that, for every conjunction, there exists a set of its conjuncts and argues
that there is a proper class of true contingent propositions. Hence, if The
Question is asking for an explanation of the conjunction of all contingent
truths, it is ill-posed, for there is no such fact to be explained. According
to McDaniel, The Question is highly ambiguous because there are many
different modes of being and, for any of those modes of being, one might
be taken to be asking why there are things that enjoy that particular mode
of being. However, McDaniel argues, The Question presupposes that
possibly, there is nothing, and there may be modes of being, such as what
McDaniel calls the “possibilist” mode of being, to which modal concepts
cannot be applied.
McDaniel’s theory of modes of being is most interesting and, certainly,
if that theory is correct a major reorientation of our thinking about The
Question will be required. However, it is far from clear that McDaniel
is correct in holding that The Question presupposes that possibly, there
is nothing and is ill-posed if that claim is false or ill-formed. After all, it
makes perfectly good sense to ask why the Incompleteness Theorem is
true, even if one knows that the Theorem is necessarily true.
Ross also considers a second interpretation of The Question, on which
it is well-posed but can be answered without appeal to a necessary being.
On this interpretation the explanandum is the claim that some being exists.
If this is not to be a trivial question that can be answered, in Maitzen’s
way, by citing the existence of penguins, this must be due to some general
principle about explanation which would require that, in explaining why
there are any Fs at all, we must appeal to some being which is not itself
an F. However, it seems that this principle would entail the falsity of the
Principle of Sufficient Reason, and so end up undermining the argument
from contingency. In order to explain why there are any beings at all, one
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would have to appeal to a being which is not a being, which is a contradiction. As a result, that fact must lack an explanation.
Ross suggests a different moral: the defender of the Principle of Sufficient Reason must reject the existence of a kind or set containing all
beings. Furthermore, Ross goes on to argue, the defender of the Principle
of Sufficient Reason should reject the existence of a kind or set containing all contingent, concrete beings. As a result, the Principle of Sufficient
Reason actually precludes the existence of an explanatory regress-stopper
of the sort the argument from contingency envisions. For every kind or set
of beings, there must be some further being outside to explain why there
are any members of that set. This implies a proper class of beings and an
infinite regress of explanatory relations.
In the essay following Ross’s, Christopher Hughes argues that the
general strategy followed by Ross cannot escape the argument from
contingency. As Hughes sees it, arguments from contingency have two
key premises: a contingency-dependence principle (which may or may not
be derived from the Principle of Sufficient Reason), which states that
every contingent thing or collection of contingent things must depend on
something outside itself, and “the existence of some sort of ‘sufficiently
inclusive’ being” (100–101), such as The World or the conjunction of all
contingent true propositions or the kind or set of all contingent beings.
According to Hughes, the second assumption—the one Ross challenges—
can in fact be dispensed with by the device of plural quantification. Thus
the sufficiently inclusive being premise would be unneeded if the contingency-dependence principle were formulated as follows:
If any being is contingent, or any beings are (all) contingent, then there is
some being outside that being or outside (all) those beings, on which that
being or at least one of those beings depends (102).

It is, however, unclear whether this makes any difference, for if one is
inclined to deny the existence of a set of all contingent beings, one may
equally well reject the (plural-quantified) claim:
There are some beings such that every contingent being is among them.

Perhaps this plural-quantified statement is more plausible than its settheoretic or mereological relatives, but Hughes has not given an argument
for that assessment.
Although I have focused here on issues relevant to the argument from
contingency, this volume also contains interesting discussion of other important issues in metaphysics, including articles by David Efird and Tom
Stoneham (chapter 9), John Heil (chapter 10), E. J. Lowe (chapter 11), and
Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (chapter 12) on the metaphysical possibility
of an empty world. Metaphysicians, philosophers of religion, and philosophers of science will all find much to interest them in this volume.

